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Abstract
This paper considers an extension of generalized Lorenz dominance (GL) criterion
to the case of multivariate attributes. Based on the uniform majorization of Kolm
(1977), we propose an extended version of GL which we call uniform supermajoriza-
tion which allows for attributes with diﬀerent means. It is verified that uniform su-
permajorization has similar implications as uniform majorization for welfare ordering.
Furthermore, we show that this criterion can be used for comparison of distributions of
unequal populations. We also provide a procedure for empirical investigations which
is in the standard form of linear programming problems.
key words: Generalized Lorenz dominance, Multidimensional inequality, Uniform
majorization.
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1 Introduction
Generalized Lorenz dominance (GL) proposed by Shorrocks (1983) and Kakwani (1984) is
one of the most frequently used criteria in the empirical literature of income inequality.1
There are some important reasons why GL is appropriate for investigating income inequal-
ity and social welfare ordering. First, as with the ordinary Lorenz dominance criterion,
GL brings a clear welfare implication referred to as Shorrocks Theorem.2 Second, under
the assumption of replication invariance on social evaluation function (SEF), a welfare
∗This study is supported by CEAKS University of Toyama, and JSPS KAKENHI (21530309). An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop held at Renmin University of China. I am
grateful to Guanjian Xu, Jun Cui, and Jianguo Jiao.
†Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama. Email: knakamur@eco.u-toyama.ac.jp
1Kakwani (1984) provided an international comparison of welfare rankings based on GL. Bishop et al.
(1993) implemented GL comparison for ten western countries based on Luxembourg Income Study data.
Chiou (1996) analyzed the Taiwanese distribution of income by using GL. Mukhopadhaya (2003) analyzed
the change in the social welfare in Singapore using GL and other dominance criteria.
2See Shorrocks (1983) and Lambert (1993, ch.3).
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comparison between societies with diﬀerent population sizes can be performed easily.3 Fi-
nally, drawing the generalized Lorenz curve, we can easily implement welfare comparison
based on the GL criterion.
Although income and wealth are primary factors characterizing well-being of person,
other variables such as health, education and environmental quality also play key roles as
determinants of welfare. For example, the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United
Nations is intended to evaluate well-being of society with respect to living standard, health,
and education. Investigations on disparities based on multivariate attributes have been
considered in many fields of economics, including development economics, public finance
and regional economics.
This paper extends the GL criterion to the case of multivariate attributes. Inferences
on multidimensional inequality are classified into two approaches: aggregative and non-
aggregative. In the aggregative approach, a variety of inequality indices that reflect the
multivariate attributes have been developed and their properties have been investigated.4
Furthermore, by using developed indices, much literature has considered empirically mul-
tidimensional inequality in various countries and periods.5 Within the context of the non-
aggregative approach, Lorenz dominance criterion by Atkinson (1970) has been extended
to various types of multidimensional criteria. For example, Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987) proposed a procedure referred to as sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGL)
which compares the distribution of income reflecting diﬀerences in needs among house-
holds.6
Uniform majorization (UM) proposed by Kolm (1977) also can be classified into the
non-aggregative approach as an extension of the ordinary Lorenz dominance criterion.7
As pointed out by Kolm, UM has a clear welfare implication which is the same as that of
univariate Lorenz dominance. A pair-wise comparison of distributions employing UM can
be implemented in the case of equal means for each pair of compared attributes. However,
this is not always the case in practice. In empirical analysis, we usually have to consider
welfare ordering by comparing distributions having diﬀerent mean and population sizes.
3 It should be noted that replication invariance is a controversial property in evaluating social welfare.
See Aboudi et al. (2010) and Blackorby et al. (2009).
4For example, see Weymark (2006), and Tsui (1999).
5Lugo (2007) compared the multidimensional inequality indices by applying them to Argentina data,
and investigated the features and limitations of multidimensional inequality indices including Maasoumi
(1986), Tsui (1995) and Bourguignon (1999). Brandolini (2008) investigated income and health inequalities
in EU countries by using various inequality indices including those of Maasoumi (1986), Tsui (1995), and
Bourguignon and Chakravaty (2003).
6Employing multi-dimensional dominance approaches based on SGL, Nilsson (2010) considered the
inequality among Zambian households. Muller and Trannoy (2011) proposed a multidimensional dominance
criterion having attributes consisting of income, health and education and investigated the change in the
welfare distribution among countries between 2000 and 2004.
7Various concepts of multivariate majorization are discussed in Marshall and Olkin (2009, ch.15). In
the literature of the economic inequality, by introducing the concept of Lorenz zonotope, Koshevoy (1995)
investigated a multivariate generalization of the Lorenz curve. See also Koshevoy and Mosler (2007). Tsui
(1999) proposed correlation increasing majorization which focuses on the transfer of resources to increase
correlation among individual resource endowment. Kolm (1977) and List (1999) considered nonnegative
price majorization, in which the attributes of each person are summed up using nonnegative weight.
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As a result, UM itself is not employed to compare such distributions, although it has been
taken as an axiom to be satisfied by multidimensional inequality indices.8
Herein, we focus on an extension of UM to the case where both population size and
attribute mean diﬀer for the pair of distributions. Consequently, such an extension is
also a generalization of GL. It is desirable that an extended version of GL maintains
the convenient properties noted above. The extension we propose has the same welfare
implications as GL. In addition, this is achieved without any additional specifications on
the utility and social welfare.
In order to link the theoretical results with practical investigation, we provide an em-
pirical procedure based on linear programming. When considering well-being consisting of
multivariate attributes, it is not possible to provide a graphical representation like the gen-
eralized Lorenz curve. Instead of such geometric investigation, we will show a procedure
to obtain the welfare ranking by using a linear-programming model. The procedure pre-
sented in this paper has some advantages. First, when one distribution does not dominate
the other distribution, we can show quantitatively each individual’s shortage of attributes
to achieve welfare superiority by solving the linear programming problem. This may be
useful information for policy makers. Second, by solving the linear programming problem,
we can know a preference on attributes that does not lead to welfare superiority if there
is no relationship between distributions of attributes.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide
an analytical framework. In Section 3, we consider the extension of GL to the case of
multivariate attributes. In Section 4, we deal with comparisons among distribution with
diﬀerent population sizes. In Section 5, we present an empirical procedure. We illustrate
the procedure by using Chinese provincial data in Section 6. In the last section, we
conclude the analysis.
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 Individuals, Attributes and their Distributions
Let X and Y be two empirical distributions of m attributes among nX and nY persons,
respectively. Thus, two distributions of attributes are represented by m-by-nJ matrices as
follows:
X ≡ [x1, ...,xnX ] ∈ Rm,nX , (1)
Y ≡ [y1, ...,ynY ] ∈ Rm,nY , (2)
where m-dimensional column vectors xi and yi represent the attributes of person i as
follows:
8For example, see Tsui (1995, 1999), and Gajdos and Weymark (2005).
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xi =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
x1i
...
xmi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ∈ R
nX , yi =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
y1i
...
ymi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ∈ R
nY .
Hereinafter, a society whose distribution of attributes is characterized by J = X,Y is
referred to as society J . In a later section when we focus on a distribution of one of
m attributes, row vectors xj and yj representing the marginal distribution of attribute
j = 1, . . . ,m will be used. That is,
xj = [xj1, ..., xjnX ],
yj = [yj1, ..., yjnY ].
Example 1 (Empirical distribution of attributes). Consider a society consisting of three
persons. Suppose that income and health status aﬀect their well-being. In this case, the
distribution of attributes can be written by the 2-by-3 matrix X as follows:
person1 p erson2 person3
X =
incom e{
health{
"
x11 x12 x13
x21 x22 x23
#
.
2.2 Utility Index
Suppose that utility of each person depends on her/his attributes and is represented by
a utility index. The utility index is not necessarily a utility function. We can imagine
a situation in which a policy maker or a researcher uses the utility index to evaluate
individuals’ utility. The utility index of i = 1, ..., nX can be written as follows:
ui = u(xi). (3)
The utility index of individuals in society Y can be represented analogously.
We make the following assumption on the utility index.
Assumption 1. The utility index has the following properties:
(i) u is nondecreasing in each attribute. That is, for ∆xi ≥ 0,
u(xi +∆xi) ≥ u(xi).
(ii) u is concave in xi. That is, for λ ∈ [0, 1], x0i and x00i , the following inequality holds:
u[λx0i + (1− λ)x00i ] ≥ λu(x0i) + (1− λ)u(x00i ).
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(iii) u is continuous.
Hereafter, we denote the set of the utility indices satisfying Assumption 1 as Ωu.
2.3 Social Evaluation Function (SEF)
For u ∈ Ωu, consider a SEF represented as follows: for J = X,Y ,
SWJ = SW (uJ), (4)
where uJ ≡ [u1, ..., unJ ] denotes a vector of the utility indices. We make the following
assumptions on the SEF.
Assumption 2. The SEF is an increasing and Schur concave in uJ .
We denote the set of the SEFs satisfying Assumption 2 as ΩW . If we concentrate our
attention on the diﬀerentiable function, Schur concave SWF is characterized by the condi-
tions that SW is symmetric with respect to u and (ui − uj) (∂SW/∂ui − ∂SW/∂uj) ≤ 0
holds for all i, j = 1, ..., nJ .9
Example 2 (Schur concave function). The following social welfare functions belong to
ΩW .
SWB =
nJX
i=1
(ui)
β , for β ∈ (0, 1],
SWS =
PnJ
i=1 ui
nJ
(1−GINIu) .
where GINIu denotes the Gini coeﬃcient of the distribution of utility index. ¤
In the above SWFs, SWS , can be interpreted as a utility version of Sen’s social welfare
function.
3 Generalization of Shorrocks Theorem
In this section, we consider a situation in which two societies have equal population. For
notational simplicity, the number of person in each society is denoted by n ≡ nX = nY .
9For detail discussion, see Marshall et al. (2011, ch. 3) and Bhatia (1997, II.3).
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3.1 Generalized Lorenz Dominance
Before considering multivariate dominance criterion, we confirm properties of the uni-
variate GL. If we concentrate on the case of equal population, the GL criterion can be
described as follows:
Definition 1 (Generalized Lorenz Dominance). Let x and y be n-dimensional real row
vectors with nonnegative entries. The vector x dominates y in the sense of generalized
Lorenz dominance if and only if
Pk
i=1 x
↑
i ≥
Pk
i=1 y
↑
i holds for k = 1, ..., n, where x
↑
i and
y↑i are entries of x and y in increasing order, respectively.
In the literature of the theory of majorization, GL is said to be a weak supermajoriza-
tion.10 For two distributions with equal population, if x generalized Lorenz dominates y,
we can say that x is weakly supermajorized by y (in symbols, x ≺w y). Weak superma-
jorization can be characterized by using doubly stochastic matrix, which is a nonnegative
square matrix whose row and column sums are all one. We denote the set of all doubly
stochastic matrices with order n as Ψn.
Lemma 1. Let x and y be n-dimensional row vectors. The following two conditions are
equivalent.
(i) x ≺w y.
(ii) There exist some P ∈ Ψn and nonnegative vector s ∈ Rn+ such that
yP + s = x. (5)
Proof. Suppose that (i) holds. Then, we can find an nonnegative scalar α such asPn
i=1 x
↑
i =
Pn
i=1 y
↑
i + α. Now, we define yˆ
↑
n ≡ y↑n + α. Since [x↑1, ..., x
↑
n] is majorized by
[y↑1, ..., y
↑
n−1, yˆ
↑
n], there exists P ∈ Ψn such that yP+ sˆ = x holds, where sˆ = [0, ..., 0,α]P ≥
0. This implies (ii). Conversely, suppose that (ii) holds. We have yP = x−s for some
P ∈ Ψn which implies
Pk
i=1(xi − si)↑ ≥
Pk
i=1 y
↑
i for k = 1, ..., n− 1 and
Pn
i=1(xi − si)↑ =Pn
i=1 y
↑
i . Clearly,
Pk
i=1 x
↑
i ≥
Pk
i=1(xi− si)↑ holds for k = 1, ..., n, which implies (i). ¥
It should be noted that in the univariate case, the characterization of majorization
by doubly stochastic matrix coincides with that by T-transform. However, these two
characterizations lead to diﬀerent consequences when we consider the multidimensional
majorization.11 In the next subsection, we consider an extension of GL criterion in line
with (5).
10For example, see Saposnik (1993).
11See Weymark (2006). In Marshall et al. (2011, ch. 15), the uniform majorization is referred to as
simply majorization. On the other hand, they use the term of chain majorization if a distribution is
obtained from products of T-transformation of the other distribution.
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3.2 Multivariate Majorization
The following definition of multivariate majorization can be regarded as a straightforward
extension of (5).
Definition 2 (Uniform Supermajorization). Let X and Y be m-by-n matrices. X is said
to be uniformly supermajorized by Y (in symbols, X ≺w Y ) if
Y P ≤ X, (6)
holds for a doubly stochastic matrix P .
If (6) holds with equality X is said to be uniformly majorized by Y (in symbols,
X ≺ Y ). It is clear that X ≺ Y implies X ≺w Y . Thus, UM can be regarded as a special
case of uniform supermajorization. It is also clear that GL is a special case of uniform
supermajorization.
Example 3 (Uniform supermajorization). Consider a society consisting of three persons
and two attributes. Let X and Y be two matrices defined as follows:
X =
"
45 65 35
30 50 45
#
, Y =
"
10 50 80
40 20 60
#
.
We can confirm X ≺w Y , since there exists a doubly matrix,
P =
⎡
⎢⎣
0.3 0.1 0.6
0.6 0.3 0.1
0.1 0.6 0.3
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
such that Y P ≤ X holds. Indeed,
Y P =
"
41 64 35
30 46 44
#
≤
"
45 65 35
30 50 45
#
= X.
holds.
We can confirm some basic properties of uniform supermajorization as follows:
Remark 1. Let X,Y,Z be m-by-n matrices.
(i) X ≺w X.
(ii) If X ≺w Y and Y ≺w Z hold then X ≺w Z holds.
(iii) If X ≺w Y and Z ≺w Y hold then λX + (1− λ)Z ≺w Y holds for λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iv) If X ≺w Y holds then X [J ] ≺w Y [J ] holds for each J ⊂ {1, ...,m}, where X [J ] is
a submatrix of X whose rows are the rows of X indexed by the elements in J .
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In Remark 1, (i) and (ii) represent reflexivity and transitivity, respectively. (iii) implies
pre-order induced by ≺w is a convex order. (iv) implies that a necessary condition for
X ≺w Y is that xj generalized Lorenz dominates yj for j = 1, ...,m.
3.3 Relation to Other Majorization Criteria
In the theory of stochastic dominance, uniform supermajorization is known as increasing-
concave (second-order) stochastic ordering (ICV).12 In this sense, the concept of uniform
supermajorization is already-known rather than novel. However, by considering ICV based
on empirical distributions, we can relate ICV to other majorization criteria.
First, it should be noted that the doubly stochastic matrix can be regarded as a special
case of row-stochastic matrix. A s-by-k dimensional nonnegative matrix whose row sum are
all one is called row stochastic. Let ΨRs,k be the set of all s-by-k row stochastic matrices.
That is, for R ∈ ΨRs,k, ReTk = eTk and R > O hold, where ek denotes a k-dimensional
row vector whose entries are one.13 The set of all row stochastic square matrices with
n-dimension is denoted as ΨRn .
Dahl (1999) proposed (right) matrix majorization. For X and Y ∈ Rm,n, X is (right)
matrix majorized by Y if there exists R ∈ ΨRn such that Y R = X holds. In Dahl’s matrix
majorization, R is not necessarily square matrix: variable size in population is allowed.
On the other hand, since Y R = X implies Y eTn = Xe
T
n , total amount of each attribute
have to be the same between X and Y .
Kolm (1977) and List (1999) consider non-negative price majorization. For X and
Y ∈ Rm,n, X is said to be non-negative price majorized by Y if vX ≺ vY for all v ∈
Rm+ . That is, vY P = vX holds for some P ∈ Ψn. Price majorization is referred to as
non-negative linear-combinations majorization in Marshall et al. (2011, ch. 15). Since
vY PeTn = vY e
T
n = vXe
T
n , non-negative price majorization considers a situation in which
both population size and attribute mean are the same between the two distributions.
Savaglio (2011) considered rs-majorization. That is, for X and Y ∈ Rm,n, X is said
to be rs-majorized by Y if there exists a row stochastic matrix R such that RY T = XT
holds. In Pería et al. (2005), rs-majorization is referred to as weak matrix majorization.
Marshall et al. (2011, ch. 15) use the term of "column-stochastic majorization" in place
of rs-majorization, since RY T = XT can be rewritten as Y RT = X. In rs-majorization,
total amount of each attribute may diﬀer while the size in population is fixed.
Two types of matrix majorizations proposed by Dahl (1999) and Savaglio (2011) are
closely related to UM as understood from that the relation between two matrices are
related by equality. Clearly, Y P = X for some P ∈ Ψn implies Y R = X and Y RT = X
for some R ∈ ΨRn .
We can consider the inequality versions of the majorizations described above as follows:
Let X and Y be m-by-n matrices.
12For example, see Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, ch. 5), and Marshall et al. (2011. ch.17).
13 In what follows, superscript T denotes the transpose operation.
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(RM) There exists some row stochastic matrix R such that Y R ≤ X holds.
(PM) For all non-negative m-dimensional vector v, vX ≺w vY holds.
(CM) There exists some row stochastic matrix R such that Y RT ≤ X holds.
It is clear (RM), (PM) and (CM) correspond to the inequality versions of (right)
matrix majorization, non-negative price majorization and rs-majorization, respectively.
The relations between uniform supermajorization, (RM), and (PM) can be summarized
as follows:
Remark 2. Let X,Y ∈ Rm,n. If X ≺w Y then,
(i) Y R ≤ X holds for some R ∈ ΨRn ;
(ii) vX ≺w vY holds for all v ∈ Rm+ .
Proof. (i) follows from Ψn ⊂ ΨRn . Y P ≤ X implies vY P ≤ vX due to v ∈ Rm+ . ¥
Furthermore, we obtain the following property relating (PM) to (CM), which is a
straightforward application of Pería et al. (2003, Proposition 3.3).
Remark 3. Let X,Y ∈ Rm,n. If vX ≺w vY holds for all v ∈ Rm+ then Y RT ≤ X holds
for some R ∈ ΨRn .
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Thus, from Remark 2, it is verified that X ≺w Y ⇒ (RM). In addition, together
Remark 3 with Remark 2, we obtain X ≺w Y ⇒ (PM)⇒ (CM). However, the reciprocal
implications are not always true as shown in the following examples.
Example 4 ((RM) does not imply X ≺w Y ). Consider the following two matrices.
X =
"
5 10 40
5 1 15
#
, Y =
"
10 10 30
5 5 5
#
.
Considering a matrix
R0 =
⎡
⎢⎣
0.2 0 0.8
0.2 0 0.8
0 0.2 0.8
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
we can confirm
Y R0 =
"
4 6 40
2 1 12
#
≤
"
5 10 40
5 1 15
#
= X.
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On the other hand, it is easily verified that X [1] ⊀w Y [1] and X [2] ⊀w Y [2]. This implies
X ⊀w Y from Remark 1(iv).
Example 5 ((PM) does not imply X ≺w Y ). Let X and Y be two matrices.
X =
"
1 2 3
3 4 6
#
, Y =
"
1 2 3
2 5 6
#
.
We can easily confirm (PM) holds. On the other hand, consider a matrix A = [aij ]
such that Y A ≤ X, AeT3 = eT3 and e3A = e3 hold. Since y1a1 ≤ 1 and a1eT3 = 1
must hold, a1 becomes a1 = (1, 0, 0)
T as long as a1 ≥ 0. This means a2 = (0, aˆ, 1− aˆ)T
and a3 = (0, 1− aˆ, aˆ)T . Furthermore, y2a2 ≤ 4 must hold for Y A ≤ X. Noting that
a22 = 1− a32 for e3A = e3, we have to say a32 ≤ −1. Thus, there does not exist doubly
stochastic matrix such that Y A ≤ X.
Example 6 ((CM) does not imply (PM)). Let X and Y be two matrices.
X =
"
10 10 16
10 12 16
#
, Y =
"
10 10 20
10 12 20
#
.
Consider a matrix RC ∈ ΨRn such that
RTC =
⎡
⎢⎣
1 0 0
0 1 0.5
0 0 0.5
⎤
⎥⎦ .
By using RTC , we obtain
Y RTC =
"
10 10 15
10 12 16
#
≤
"
10 10 16
10 12 16
#
= X.
However, taking v as v0 = (1, 1), we have v0XeT ≤ v0Y eT which implies v0X ⊀w v0Y .
3.4 Welfare Ordering
We turn to welfare implications carried by the uniform supermajorization. In the case of
uniform majorization, it is well known that if and only if X ≺ Y holds, then
Pn
i=1 u (xi) ≥Pn
i=1 u (yi) holds for all concave functions (e.g. Kolm, 1977; Karlin and Rinott, 1983;
Mosler, 1994; Dahl, 1999). In what follows, we will show that a similar welfare implication
holds for uniform supermajorization. To this end, we present the following lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Gale 1960, Theorem 2.8). Let A and b be an m-by-n matrix and m-
dimensional vector, respectively. Exactly one of the following alternatives holds. Either
the inequality
10
Ax ≤ b,
has a nonnegative solution x ∈ Rn+, or the inequalities
vA ≥ 0,
vb < 0,
have a nonnegative solution v ∈ Rm+ .
Proof. See Gale (1960). ¥
This Lemma can be interpreted as a separation theorem of convex sets. The next
lemma characterizes a property of piecewise linear function with concavity.
Lemma 3. Let
V ≡ {[c1,v1] , ..., [cs,vs] : ci ∈ R,vi ∈ R+} ,
be a set of s-tuples ofm+1- dimensional row vectors where vi is nonnegative. For x ∈ Rm+ ,
u(x) = min
[ci,vi]∈V
(
[ci,vi]
"
1
x
#)
, (7)
is a nondecreasing concave function in x.
Proof. Let x0, x00, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Concavity follows from a direct calculation as
u[λx0 + (1− λ)x00] = min
[ci,vi]∈V
(
[ci,vi]
Ã
λ
"
1
x0
#
+ (1− λ)
"
1
x00
#!)
≥λ min
[ci,vi]∈V
(
[ci,vi]
"
1
x0
#)
+ (1− λ) min
[ci,vi]∈V
(
[ci,vi]
"
1
x00
#)
=λu(x0) + (1− λ)u(x00).
Since vi ≥ 0, u is nondecreasing in x. ¥
The utility index addressed in (7) can be interpreted as a piecewise linear approxima-
tion of general nondecreasing concave utility index. Now, we state the main theorem. The
proof of proposition is motivated by Dahl (1999, Theorem 3.3).
Proposition 1. Let X,Y ∈ Rm,n be m-by-n matrices consisting of n-dimensional column
vectors xi and yi, respectively. The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) X ≺w Y .
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(ii)
Pn
i=1 u (xi) ≥
Pn
i=1 u (yi) holds for all u ∈ Ωu.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii) follows from the nondecreasingness and concavity of u. Now we turn to
(ii)⇒ (i). Let us consider a situation where
Y P 6≤ X, (8)
for all P ∈ Ψn. Vectorizing (8), we obtain an equivalent condition as follows14:
A˜pˆ ≤ b˜, (9)
does not have nonnegative solution pˆ, where
A˜ ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
In ⊗ Y
en ⊗ In
−en ⊗ In
In ⊗ en
−In ⊗ en
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, b˜ ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
vecX
eTn
−eTn
eTn
−eTn
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
In the above expressions, ⊗ and vec stand for the Kronecker product and column stacking
operators, respectively. In addition, en denotes an n-dimensional row vector whose entries
are one, and In is an n-dimensional identity matrix. From Lemma 2, it can be verified
that
vA˜ ≥ 0, (10)
and
vb < 0, (11)
have a nonnegative solution. Let v∗ ≡ [v∗1, ...,v∗n, zˇ∗, zˆ∗, cˇ∗, cˆ∗] be a solution of (10) and
(11), where v∗i ∈ Rm+ for i = 1, ..., n and zˇ∗, zˆ∗, cˇ∗, cˆ∗ ∈ Rn. Thus, from (10), we obtain
v∗iyj + z
∗
j + c
∗
i ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, ..., n, where z∗j ≡ zˇ∗j − zˆ∗j and c∗i ≡ cˇ∗i − cˆ∗i . Furthermore,
from (11), we have
Pn
i=1 (v
∗
i xi + z
∗
i + c
∗
i ) < 0. Defining V ≡ {[c∗1,v∗1] , ..., [c∗n,v∗n]}, we can
easily verify that
nX
i=1
(v∗i xi + z
∗
i + c
∗
i ) ≥
nX
i=1
min
[cj ,vj ]∈V
(
[c∗j ,v
∗
j ]
"
1
xi
#)
+
nX
i=1
z∗i ,
nX
i=1
min
[cj ,vj ]∈V
(
[c∗j ,v
∗
j ]
"
1
yi
#)
+
nX
i=1
z∗j ≥ 0.
Thus, we have
14 In this vectorizing procedure, P is converted to pˆ(≡ vecP ).
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nX
i=1
min
[cj ,vj ]∈V
(
[c∗j ,v
∗
j ]
"
1
yi
#)
>
nX
i=1
min
[cj ,vj ]∈V
(
[c∗j ,v
∗
j ]
"
1
xi
#)
.
From Lemma 3, u(x) = min
[ci,vi]∈V
(
[ci,vi]
"
1
x
#)
is nondecreasing and concave. By con-
sidering a utility index that takes the form of (7), we can conclude that
nX
i=1
u(xi) <
nX
i=1
u(yi), (12)
holds. Therefore, if
nP
i=1
u(xi) ≥
nP
i=1
u(yi) holds for all u ∈ Ωu then Y P ≤ X holds for some
P ∈ Ψn. ¥
In the literature of inequality, a SEF based on individual utility is sometimes employed.
The result obtained by Proposition 1 does not change even if we adopt a two-step approach
to obtain a welfare implication from multivariate distribution.15
Corollary 1. Let X,Y ∈ Rm,n. The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) X ≺w Y .
(ii) SW (uX) ≥ SW (uY ) holds for all u ∈ Ωu and SW ∈ ΩW .
Proof. (ii) ⇒ (i) is obvious because
Pn
i=1 u(xi) ∈ ΩW and from Proposition 1. Con-
versely, suppose that X ≺w Y holds. From Proposition 1, we obtain that
nX
i=1
u(xi) ≥
nX
i=1
u(yi),
holds for all u ∈ Ωu. Let V ∗∗ be a set such that V ∗∗(zk) = {[zk, 0], [0, 1]} for zk ∈ (0,∞).
From Lemma 3,
g (xi, zk) = min
v∗∗∈V ∗∗(zk)
(
v∗∗
"
1
u(xi)
#)
, (13)
is nondecreasing concave. Thus, applying Proposition 1 to (13), we obtain
Pn
i=1 g (xi, zk) ≥Pn
i=1 g (yi, zk) for all zk ∈ (0,∞). Let us define u
↑
X ≡ [u(x1)↑, ..., u(xn)↑], whose elements
are arranged in increasing order of u(xi). We define u
↑
Y in a similar manner. We choose
zk as u(yk)↑ for k ∈ {1, ..., n}. Substituting zk = u(yk)↑ into (13) and summing, we can
verified that
15For example, Trannoy and Weymark (2007) considered the properties of the generalized Lorenz dom-
inance for a utility distribution.
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nX
i=1
g[yi, u(yk)
↑] =
kX
i=1
u(yi)
↑ + (n− k)u(yk)↑,
and
nX
i=1
g[xi, u(yk)
↑] =
nX
i=1
u(xi)
↑ −
nX
i=1
[u(xi)
↑ − u(yk)↑]+
=
kX
i=1
u(xi)
↑ +
nX
i=k+1
n
u(xi)
↑ − [u(xi)↑ − u(yk)↑]+
o
−
kX
i=1
[u(xi)
↑ − u(yk)↑]+
≤
kX
i=1
u(xi)
↑ +
nX
i=k+1
min{u(xi)↑, u(yk)↑},
hold for k = 1, ..., n, where a+ ≡ max{0, a}. Noting that (n−k)zk ≥
Pn˜
i=k+1min
©
u(xi)
↑, zk
ª
and (12), we obtain
Pk
i=1 u(xi)
↑ ≥
Pk
i=1 u(yi)
↑, for k = 1, . . . , n. This inequality implies
that uY weakly supermajorizes uX . Since SW is assumed to be increasing and Schur
concave in u,
SW (uX) ≥ SW (uY ),
holds. ¥
Proposition 1 and its corollary state that the Shorrocks Theorem can be extended
to case of multivariate attributes. However, in practice, we have to compare situations
involving populations of diﬀerent size. In the next section, we will turn to this problem.
4 Diﬀerent Population Sizes
4.1 SEF with Replication Invariance
In this section, we characterize uniform supermajorization under diﬀerent population sizes.
In the case of univariate attributes, the generalized Lorenz curve provides complete infor-
mation to a SEF that satisfies replication invariance.16 For the multivariate case, we can
obtain the welfare implications based on a doubly stochastic matrix.
First, we rewrite the SEF (4) so as to make the replication explicit. Consider the
following representation using the natural number μ:
16For further discussion, see Aboudi et al. (2010).
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sw (uJ ,μnJ) = sw(u1, ..., u1| {z }
μ
, ..., unJ , ..., unJ| {z })
μ
. (14)
In (14), μ = 1 implies a SEF with no scale adjustment. In order to maintain comparability,
we focus on SEFs satisfying the following property.
Assumption 3. The SEF (14) is homogenous degree of zero in nJ : for μ > 0,
sw (uJ , nJ) = sw (uJ ,μnJ) , (15)
holds.
Assumption 3 is referred to as the replication invariance principle.17 We denote the
set of SEFs satisfying Assumption 2 and 3 as Ωw. Clearly, Ωw ⊂ ΩW .
4.2 Uniform Supermajorization under Diﬀerent Population Sizes
Let us replicate X and Y so as to have a population of n˜ ≡ nXnY explained as follows. In
order to obtain a replicated distribution of attributes, we define replication matrices GY
and GX as follows:
GY ≡ InY ⊗ enX ∈ R
nY ,n˜
+ ,
GX ≡ InX ⊗ enY ∈ R
nX ,n˜
+ ,
By using the replication matrix GJ , J = X,Y , we obtain the distribution of a n˜ ≡ nXnY
population based on X and Y . The replicated distributions X∗ and Y ∗ are respectively
defined as follows:
Y ∗ ≡ Y GY ∈ Rm,n˜+ , (16)
X∗ ≡ Y GX ∈ Rm,n˜+ . (17)
Thus, we can apply Proposition 1 to the distributions Y ∗ and X∗. However, it is diﬃ-
cult to solve the matrix inequality (6) due to the extreme size of the matrices. Fortunately,
we can reduce the size of vector and matrices to investigate the welfare orderings. To this
end, we define a compressed form of doubly stochastic matrix. This is essentially same as
the matrix defined in Aboudi et al. (2010, Definition 3.1).
Definition 3 (Compressed Doubly Stochastic Matrix). A nY -by-nX matrix Q is said to
be a compressed doubly stochastic matrix for nY and nX if the following properties are
satisfied:
17For example, see Tsui (1999).
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enYQ = nY enX , (18)
QeTnX = nXe
T
nY
, (19)
and
Q ≥ O. (20)
The compressed doubly stochastic matrix is a nonnegative matrix whose column- and
row-sum are respectively nY and nX . Hereafter, we denote the set of all compressed
doubly stochastic matrices for nY and nX as Ψ (nY , nX). Clearly, Q ∈ Ψ(nY , nX) implies
QT ∈ Ψ(nX , nY ). In addition, we define a matrix X˜ as follows:
X˜ ≡ nYX. (21)
The following lemma gives an equivalent condition for uniform supermajorization when
the populations diﬀer in size.
Lemma 4. LetX ∈ Rm,nX , Y ∈ Rm,nY , andX∗, Y ∗ ∈ Rm,n˜. The following two conditions
are equivalent:
(i) X∗ ≺w Y ∗.
(ii) Y Q ≤ X˜ holds for some Q ∈ Ψ(nY , nX).
Proof. It is suﬃcient to prove that Y ∗P = X∗ ⇔ Y Q = X˜ for P ∈ Ψn˜ and Q ∈
Ψ(nY , nX). Suppose that there exists P ∈ Ψn˜ such that Y ∗P = X∗. Noting that
Y ∗ = Y GY , we obtain Y ∗PGTX = Y GY PG
T
X = X
∗GTX , where GY PG
T
X is an nY -by-nX
matrix with nonnegative elements. In addition, GY PGTXe
T
nX
= nXe
T
nY
and enYGY PG
T
X =
nY enX hold. Therefore, we obtain GY PG
T
X ∈ Ψ(nY , nX). Furthermore, it is clear that
X∗GTX = nYX. Conversely, suppose that Y Q = X˜ holds for some Q ∈ Ψ(nY , nX). We
can easily confirm that G˜Y ≡ (1/nX)GTY and G˜X ≡ (1/nY )GTX are the generalized inverse
matrices of GY and GX , respectively.18 Noting that Y = Y ∗G˜Y , we obtain Y Q = Y ∗G˜YQ.
Furthermore, we have X˜G˜TX = X
∗. Therefore, Y Q = X˜ implies that Y ∗G˜YQG˜TX = X
∗.
In this equation, we can easily confirm that
G˜YQG˜
T
Xe
T
n˜ = G˜YQe
T
nX
= nXG˜Y e
T
nY
= eTn˜ ,
and
en˜G˜YQG˜
T
X = enYQG˜
T
X = nY enX G˜
T
X = en˜,
18A matrix G˜ is said to be a generalized inverse of G if and only if G˜GG˜ = G holds. See Rao and Mitra
(1971, ch. 2).
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hold. Moreover, it is obvious that G˜YQG˜TX ≥ O holds. Hence, we obtain G˜YQG˜TX ∈ Ψn˜.
Thus, Y ∗P = X∗ ⇔ Y Q = X˜ is proved. ¥
Putting together Proposition 1 with Lemma 4, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Let X ∈ Rm,nX and Y ∈ Rm,nY be two distributions of attributes. The
following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists Q ∈ Ψ(nY , nX) satisfying
Y Q ≤ X˜. (22)
(ii) sw(uX , nX) ≥ sw(uY , nY ) for all u ∈ Ωu and sw ∈ Ωw.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 1, Corollary 1, and Lemma 4. ¥
If we consider a distribution consisting of one attribute e.g., income, we can infer
the welfare implications for two distributions without relying on Proposition 2. That is,
the generalized Lorenz dominance criterion can be easily checked by using the familiar
graphical representation. However, in the present situation where individual’s well-being
depends on more than two attributes, it is diﬃcult to obtain the welfare implications by
geometrical procedures. In the next section, we show an algebraic procedure to confirm
Proposition 2.
5 Empirical Procedures
5.1 Equivalent Linear Programming Model
In this section, we describe the empirical procedures to confirm Proposition 2. In the the-
ory of majorization, Dahl (1999, Theorem 3.6) suggests a characterization of majorization
using a linear programming model.19 In line with his perspective, we propose a procedure
for the empirical analysis.
First, vectorizing the matrix inequality (22), we obtain
[InY ⊗ Y ] vecQ ≤ vec X˜. (23)
Next, Q ∈ Ψ(nY , nX) implies that"
enX ⊗ InY
InX ⊗ enY
#
vecQ =
"
nXe
T
nY
nY e
T
nX
#
, (24)
and vecQ ≥ 0 must hold.
19See also Mosler and Scarsini (1991, Example 3.4).
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From (23) and (24), we can consider the following linear programming problem.
Problem 1 (P1).
min
q
aq, (25)
subject to
Aeqq = beq, (26)
q ≥ 0, (27)
where
a ≡ [0n˜+mnX ,wL] ∈ R
n˜+2mnX
+ ,
Aeq ≡
⎡
⎢⎣
InX ⊗ Y ImnX −ImnX
enX ⊗ InY O O
InX ⊗ enY O O
⎤
⎥⎦ ∈ R(m+1)nX+nY ,n˜+2mnX+ ,
beq ≡
⎡
⎢⎣
vec X˜
nXe
T
nY
nY e
T
nX
⎤
⎥⎦ ∈ R(m+1)nX+nY+ ,
and wL ∈ RmnX++ .
For (P1), the dual problem can be written as maxq˜ q˜beq subject to q˜Aeq ≤ a. It can
be easily shown that the solution to the dual problem exists.20 By the duality theorem,
therefore, (P1) also has a bounded optimal solution. Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 3. The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) The optimal value of (P1) is zero.
(ii) sw(uX , nX) ≥ sw(uY , nY ) holds for all u ∈ Ωu and sw ∈ Ωw.
Proof. This is obvious from (23) and (24). ¥
According to Proposition 3, we can easily verify the relationship of welfare dominance
for two societies. Given two distributions X and Y , we first solve (P1) and obtain the
optimal value. If the optimal value is equal to zero, then the social welfare in society X
is higher than that in society Y in the sense of uniform supermajorization. In contrast, if
20 It is obvious that q˜ = 0 is a feasible solution. We decompose the vector q˜ as q˜ = [q˜n, q˜v], where
q˜n˜ ∈ Rn˜ and q˜v ∈ RnX+nY . Since q˜n˜ is restricted by 0 ≥ q˜n˜ ≥ −wL, the optimal solution is bounded.
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the optimal value is strictly positive, then we have two possibilities. One is that the social
welfare in Y is higher than in X. The other is that neither society is superior in terms of
social welfare. Interchanging the roles of X and Y in (P1), one can identify which is the
case.
Of course, uniform supermajorization gives a preorder to distribution of attributes.
Thus, we may face a situation where the welfare orderings between two distributions
cannot be determined. Even in such a situation, solving (P1), we obtain useful information.
Consider a situation in which X 6≺w Y and Y 6≺w X. First, it should be noted that in (P1),
the vector, wL, can be interpreted as shadow prices of the respective attributes. That is,
the optimal value represents a minimum amount of resources to be added in situation X
for achieving more preferable situation than that of Y . Thus, if the policy maker has
information on the unit cost required for improving each attribute of individuals, he can
easily find a strategy for improving the welfare based on the optimal solution of (P1).
Second, the optimal vector of the dual problem provides the parameter of the utility index
which violates the majorization criterion.
One diﬃculty of applying this procedure in practice lies in the size of data. In order to
solve (P1), the number of variables is n˜+ 2mnX and the number of constraints including
nonnegativity constraints is (3m + 1)nX + nY + n˜. In this sense, this procedure will be
appropriate for grouped data or sampled data with small size. However, recent progress
in computer capabilities partially mitigates this diﬃculty.
5.2 Numerical Example
Consider two societies denoted as X and Y . In society X, there are five persons, whose
attributes are denoted as follows:
X =
⎡
⎢⎣
230 500 430 305 150
140 200 250 230 245
175 150 325 265 150
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Similarly, society Y has four persons, whose attributes are represented as follows:
Y =
⎡
⎢⎣
100 50 800 300
300 400 100 50
50 400 250 150
⎤
⎥⎦ .
We set wL = 500 × e5. Solving (P1), we obtain the optimal value as aq∗ ≈ 5000 > 0.
This means that the distribution X does not dominates Y .21 Solving the dual problem of
(P1), we have the following vectors22
21Clearly, Y does not uniform supermajorize X, since (1/nX)XeT5 ≥ (1/nY )Y eT4 holds.
22The vectors vi and the scalar ci are generated by partitioning the optimal solution of the dual problem
as q˜ = [−v1, ...,−v5, z,−c1, ...,−c5], where z ∈ R4.
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"
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
vT1 v
T
2 v
T
3 v
T
4 v
T
5
#
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−165568 −3803 3727 −3063 −7368
500 0 0 2.928 17.623
382.363 1.485 1.973 0 11.304
0 49.969 19.650 38.236 37.106
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Let V be a set defined as V ≡ {[c1,v1], ..., [c5,v5]}. Take the SEF as
sw(uX , nX) =
1
nX
nXX
j=1
min
[ci,vi]∈V
(
[ci,vi]
"
1
xj
#)
.
Thus, we obtain sw(uX , nX) = 5726.37 < 5976.15 = sw(uY , nY ). It should be noted that
for j = 1, 2, 3, xj dominates yj in the sense of GL. This example stresses the importance
of simultaneous consideration of income and other attributes.
Detail expression of the optimal solution can be represented as follows:
aq∗ = wL ×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
10
0
...
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Thus, if the attribute 1 for individual 1 in X is increased by ∆x11 = 10/nY = 10/4 = 2.5,
then the social welfare will be improved. Indeed, if we consider a modified distribution,
X 0, in which the x1 term, [230, 140, 175]T , is replaced by [232.5, 140, 175]T , the optimal
value of (P1) becomes zero. Furthermore, from the optimal solution, we can find a doubly
stochastic matrix such that Y Q ≤ X˜ 0 holds as follows:
Q∗ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.6 2.0 0.0 0.4 2.0
0.6 0.0 2.0 1.6 0.8
0.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.0
2.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
It can be easily verified that Q∗ ∈ Ψ(nY , nX).
6 Empirical Illustration Using Chinese Provincial Data
In this section, we illustrate the empirical procedure by applying to Chinese provincial
data.23 We investigate well-being of the residents during the period of 2005 to 2009.
China, which exhibits the most rapid growth in GDP in this period, faces a serious income
disparity between the coastal and inland areas. Since the implementation of the open door
23 In what follows, we focus on the province-level divisions including province, autonomous area, and
direct-controlled municipalities. Hereinafter, we refer these divisions as province.
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policy, the Chinese government has promoted economic growth in urban areas under the
policy that regions with most potential are preferentially developed. As a result, the
economic disparity between the urban and rural areas has expanded.24 After 2000, in
order to reduce this regional inequality, the government of China has emphasized the
development of inland areas.
An increase in regional inequality resulting from the rapid growth aﬀects some aspects
of well-being of individuals. The first is environmental degradation in industrialized areas.
For example, urban air pollution causes a serious environmental problem, especially in the
industrialized areas of northern and central China (Vennemo et al., 2009). In 11th five-year
plan, China’s government has set compulsory targets for environmental protection (Cao
et al., 2009). Second, during the transition period from a command economy, accessibility
to health care services has been impaired. The number of health care workers in rural
areas has decreased by 35.9% (Liu et al., 2007) and senior level health professionals tend
to concentrate in urban facilities (Liu et al., 2007; Bloom, 2001).
Therefore, focusing on the interregional disparities of income, environmental quality,
and accessibility of health care services, we consider the welfare implications of the recent
development of the Chinese economy.25
6.1 Modified Analytical Framework
The theoretical framework presented in the previous sections should be slightly modified
since we employ the grouped data by province. Let xi and yi be the attributes of individual
who lives province i. Individuals who live in a same province are regarded as having the
same attributes. That is, the distribution of attributes can be written as follows:
X = [x1, ...,x1| {z }
n1(X)
, ...,xr, ...,xr| {z }
nr(X)
],
Y = [y1, ...,y1| {z }
n1(Y )
, ...,yr, ...,yr| {z }
nr(Y )
],
where ni(J) denotes the number of population in province i for the distribution J . Thus,
rX
i=1
ni(J) = nJ ,
where r is the total number of province. The distribution of attributes can be written
compactly as follows:
24Tsui (1996) analyzed the interprovincial inequality of income in the post-1978 period. Lee (2009)
argued that the source of regional inequality in output has shifted from intraprovincial to interprovincial
inequality since the early 1980s. Fan and Sun (2008) also considered the interprovincial inequality in
output by using recent statistical data.
25Brajer et al. (2010) and Groom et al. (2010) considered the relationship between income inequality
and environmental quality. Zhang and Kanbur (2005) considered spatial inequality in education and health
care in China.
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Xˆ ≡ [x1, ...,xr], (28)
Yˆ ≡ [y1, ...,yr], (29)
where xi denotes the attributes of individual who lives province i.
The SEF can be written as follows:
sw(uJ ,nJ) = sw(u1(J), ..., u1(J)| {z }
n1(J)
, ..., ur(J), ..., ur(J)| {z }
nr(J)
),
for J = X,Y , where nJ ≡ (n1(J), ..., nr(J)) denotes a vector consisting of the population
number for each province for J . We assume that for μ > 0, sw(uJ ,nJ) = sw(uJ ,μnJ)
holds, which implies Assumption 3 holds.
Second, the compressed doubly matrix is also slightly modified. Instead of the com-
pressed doubly stochastic matrix defined by Definition 3, we consider a r-by-r matrix as
follows.
Definition 4. An r-by-r matrix Qˆ is said to be modified compressed doubly stochastic if
the following conditions are satisfied:
erQˆ =
1
nX
nX ,
QˆeTr =
1
nY
nTY ,
and
Qˆ ≥ O.
Let Ψ (nY ,nX) be the set of modified compressed doubly stochastic matrices. That is,
a matrix Qˆ ∈ Ψ (nY ,nX) is a nonnegative square matrix whose row-sum is equal to the
population share for Y and whose column-sum is equal to that for X.
Furthermore, we define a vector corresponding to (21) in the basic model.
Xˆ∗ ≡ 1
nX
£
n1(X)x1, ..., nr(X)xr
¤
∈ Rr. (30)
The following proposition is a modified version of uniform supermajorization.
Proposition 4. For the distributions Yˆ and Xˆ, the following two conditions are equiva-
lent:
(i) Yˆ Qˆ ≤ Xˆ∗ holds for some Qˆ ∈ Ψ(nY ,nX).
(ii) sw(uX ,nX) ≥ sw(uY ,nY ) holds for all u ∈ Ωu and sw ∈ Ωw.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1. ¥
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Thus, based on Proposition 4, we can set up the linear programming model corre-
sponding to (P1).
6.2 Data and Results
The data includes 22 provinces, 4 autonomous areas, and 4 direct-controlled municipalities
consisting of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.26 We compile the data from the
China Statistical Yearbook, 2006-2010. As a proxy variable of individual income, we
employ per capita household consumption in each region, which is deflated by the GDP
deflator.27 Industrial and household SO2 emissions per land area are used as a proxy
variable representing environmental quality.28 Accessibility to health care service, where
we concentrate our attention on the physical accessibility, is measured by the number of
doctors per thousand population for each province.
Summary statistics are represented in Table 1. From Table 1, we can confirm rapid
growth in consumption. Except for the period from 2005 to 2006, the mean value of SO2
decreased. In addition, the number of doctors increased during the period. Since the
univariate GL is a necessary condition for uniform supermajorization, Table 1 shows that
pair-wise comparison for 2005 and 2006 is nonrankable.
Before investigating uniform supermajorization, we briefly show the result of the item-
by-item approach that implies the GL comparison of each attribute. Table 2 summarizes
the results. As easily expected, the pair-wise comparison of household consumption indi-
cates that recent situations are more preferable than those of earlier years except for 2007
and 2008. The distribution of environmental quality is improved after 2007. However, we
cannot say that the allocation of medical resources represented by the number of doctors
improved during the period. As a result, only three pairs, {2005, 2009}, {2007, 2009} and
{2008, 2009}, are candidates of uniform supermajorization.
Table 3 shows the optimal value of (P1) for each pair of years. From Table 3, we can
conclude that the distribution in 2009 uniformly supermajorizes the distributions of 2007
and 2008. Although the item-by-item approach implies that the distribution in 2009 is
preferable to that in 2005, the optimal value of (P1) is diﬀerent from zero, which means
the 2009 distribution is not necessarily preferred to that of 2005.
As noted in the previous section, further investigation on the nonrankable distributions
provides useful information. For example, let us compare the two distributions 2006 and
2009. From Table 3, the optimal value of (P1) is 0.0499. If we look at optimal vector q in
detail, we can find q1062 = 9.975 ∗ 10−5, where q1062 corresponds to the number of doctors
26Tibet autonomous area is excluded from the sample due to lack of data.
27We also considered per capita GRP as the income variable, and the basic results are not aﬀected.
28Since SO2 emission negatively aﬀects the well-being of people, we define environmental quality in
province i as E − SO2emission, where E denotes the reference level of environmental quality, which is
assumed to be the same among both provinces and periods. Our analysis does not depend on the value of
E.
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in Guizhou province, located in the southwestern part of China.29 Based on this result,
we can conclude that if in 2009 the number of doctors in Guizhou province was larger by
132 than the actual data, the distribution in 2009 would dominate that in 2006 in the
sense of uniform supermajorization.30
7 Concluding Remarks
We have considered an extension of the GL criterion to the case of multivariate attributes.
Based on the uniform majorization by Kolm (1977) and Marshall and Olkin (1979), we
proposed a uniform supermajorization that allows for attributes with diﬀerent means.
It can be verified that uniform supermajorization has a similar implication to uniform
majorization for welfare ordering. Furthermore, we show that this criterion will work under
comparison of distributions with unequal population sizes. We also provide a procedure
for empirical investigations which is in the standard form of linear programming problems.
The methodology proposed here has a clear welfare implication as well as GL. In
addition, the result obtained from the linear programming problem may provide useful
information to policy makers and researchers: the optimal value indicates the minimum
value for achieving welfare superior distribution compared with the base period. If the
appropriate shadow prices are available, the procedure reveals the cost for redistribution.
In the present paper, we do not provide procedures for statistical inference on uniform
supermajorization. In order to connect the theoretical analysis with the practical inves-
tigation, it will be important to check the statistical significance of the results. We leave
this for future research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Remark 3
First, vectorizing the inequality Y RT ≤ X, we obtain
Aˇr ≤ b˘, (A.1)
where
Aˇ ≡
⎡
⎢⎣
In ⊗ Y
In ⊗ en
−In ⊗ en
⎤
⎥⎦ , b˘ ≡
⎡
⎢⎣
vecX
eTn
−eTn
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
29 In the optimal vector of (P1), qi for i = 1, ..., r2, represents the elements of the compressed doubly
stochastic matrix, and qj for j = r2 + 1, ..., r2 +mr represnts the slack variables in (6).
30The population of Guizhou province in 2009 is 39780 (thousands) which is 2.89% of the whole popu-
lation in the country. If the number of doctors per thousand population were increased by q1062/2.89, the
distribution of 2009 would be preferable to that of 2006 in the sense of unform supermajorization. Thus,
we obtain the number of doctors to be increased in Guizhou province as (q1062/2.89)%× 39780 ≈ 132.
24
and r = vecR. Thus, if there exists R ∈ ΨRn such as Y RT ≤ X then Aˇr ≤ b˘ has non-
negative solution r∗. Now, suppose that (A.1) does not have nonnegative solution, which
is equivalent to Y RT £ X for all R ∈ ΨRn . From Lemma 2 stated in Section 3.4, it can be
verified that
vAˇ ≥ 0, (A.2)
and
vb˘ < 0, (A.3)
have a nonnegative solution v∗ ∈ Rn(m+2)+ . We decompose v∗ into the sub-vectors as
v∗ = [v∗1, ...,v
∗
n, cˇ
∗, cˆ∗] where v∗i ∈ Rm+ for i = 1, ..., n and cˇ∗, cˆ∗ ∈ Rn+. From (A.2), we
obtain v∗i yj + c
∗
i ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, ..., n, where c∗i ≡ cˇ∗i − cˆ∗i . It can be easily verified that
nX
i=1
min
1≤k≤n
(v∗i yk) +
nX
i=1
c∗i ≥ 0. (A.4)
On the other hand, (A.3) can be written as
Pn
i=1 v
∗
i xi +
Pn
i=1 c
∗
i < 0. This implies
nX
i=1
min
1≤k≤n
(v∗i xk) +
nX
i=1
c∗i < 0. (A.5)
Together (A.4) with (A.5), we have
Pn
i=1min1≤k≤n (v
∗
i yk) >
Pn
i=1min1≤k≤n (v
∗
i xk).
Thus, there exists at least one index i∗ such that
min
1≤k≤n
(v∗i∗yk) > min
1≤k≤n
(v∗i∗xk) ,
holds. This implies that v∗i∗X ⊀w v∗i∗Y because (v∗i∗yk)
↑
1 > (v
∗
i∗xk)
↑
1. Therefore, if
vX ≺w vY holds for all v ∈ Rm+ then Y RT ≤ X holds for some R ∈ ΨRn . ¥
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Per capita household consumption (in ten thousands 2005 RMB) 
 Mean 0.560  0.610  0.657  0.705  0.778  
 Std. Dev. 0.263  0.289  0.310  0.324  0.351  
 Min 0.330  0.354  0.382  0.366  0.421  
 Max 1.840  1.997  2.146  2.253  2.450  
SO2 emissions per provincial area (t / km2 ) a) 
 Mean 7.277  7.287  6.958  6.473  6.082  
 Std. Dev. 7.654  7.589  7.450  6.763  5.906  
 Min 0.173  0.181  0.187  0.188  0.189  
 Max 62.265  61.658  60.422  54.145  45.989  
Number of doctors per thousand population b)  
 Mean 1.510  1.545  1.550  1.592  1.770  
 Std. Dev. 0.376  0.380  0.382  0.388  0.413  
 Min 1.080  1.095  1.007  1.024  1.092  
 Max 3.293  3.339  3.385  3.484  3.581  
Total population (in ten thousands) 
  128046 128850 129635 130540 131371 
GDP deflator (2005=100) 
  100.000  103.807  111.735  120.410  119.669 c) 
Number of provinces and municipalities 
  30 30 30 30 30 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook. 
Notes: a). Based on the total amount of sulphur dioxide emissions by industry and consumption. 
b). Based on the total number of licensed doctor including assistant doctor. 
c). Estimated value by IMF, The World Economic Outlook. 
 
 
 
Table 2  Univariate GL dominance 
  Given Year: x 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2005 - C, D C, E C, E C, E, D 
2006 none - C, E C, E C, E 
2007 none none - E, D C, E, D 
2008 none none none - C, E, D 
Base year: 
y 
2009 none none none none - 
Notes: C=household consumption, E= SO2 emission, D=number of doctors. In each cell, J (=C, E, D) indicates 
variable J in the base year is GL dominated by that in the given year. 
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Table 3  Optimal value of the linear programming model (P1)a) 
  Given Year: X 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2005 - 4.905E+00 1.349E+00 1.020E+00 8.854E-03 
2006 7.858E+01 - 3.471E+00 1.208E+00 4.987E-02 
2007 2.304E+02 1.944E+02 - 6.595E-01 4.930E-11 
2008 5.161E+02 4.792E+02 2.875E+02 - 3.622E-13 
Base year: 
Y 
2009 8.364E+02 7.984E+02 6.081E+02 3.209E+02 - 
Notes: a). wL=500. Calculations have been implemented by the ‘linprog’ function of MATLAB. TolFun, which 
is a lower bound on the change in the value of the objective function during a step, is set aｔ 10E-8.   
 
 
 
 
